Hiromatsu on Mach’s Philosophy and Relativity Theory by Katsumori, Makoto
European Journal of Japanese Philosophy 1 • 2016, pp. 149–188
Hiromatsu on Mach’s Philosophy  
and Relativity Theory
In his project of going beyond the “modern worldview,” Hiromatsu Wataru 
attached great importance to Ernst Mach’s philosophical thought and 
Einstein’s theory of relativity as challenging the premises of modern phi-
losophy, which he characterized as substantialist and bound by the sub-
ject / object schema. This paper surveys Hiromatsu’s analysis of Mach’s 
phenomenalist element-monism, specifically his critique of Mach’s insuf-
ficient break with modern philosophy; his inquiry into Einstein’s relativity 
theory with a focus on its intersubjective cognitive structure; and the way 
he extends his views on these themes to a general ontological-epistemolog-
ical theory of the “fourfold structure.” Finally, it examines questions about 
Hiromatsu’s arguments regarding the tension between the dimensions of 
synchronic structure and structuring movement. 
An earlier version of this paper can be found as “Philosophers” in John 
T. Blackmore, Itagaki Ryōichi, and Tanaka Setsuko, eds., Ernst Mach’s 
Influence Spreads (Enfield, nh: Sentinel Open Press, 2009), 425–76.
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Hiromatsu Wataru 廣松渉 (1933–94), one of the leading philosophers in late twentieth-century Japan, describes the basic motif of his work 
as a systematic critique of the “modern worldview” (kindaiteki-sekaikan 近
代的世界観). Characterizing modern philosophy in general as ontologically 
“substantialist” and epistemologically bound by the “subject / object schema,” 
Hiromatsu strives to replace it with a new philosophical orientation marked 
by “the primacy of relation” and what he calls the intersubjective “fourfold 
structure.”1 This motif has its sources in his two major fields of interest: the 
thought of Karl Marx and Marxism, on the one hand, and physical-scientific 
thought, specifically in its historical phase stretching from the work of Ernst 
Mach to relativity and quantum theories, on the other.
Already as a schoolboy, Hiromatsu took a keen interest in Marxism and 
engaged in Communist-led political activities, while at the same time he was 
so attracted to natural science, especially physics, as to aspire to become a 
professional researcher in the field. These two areas of interest were, how-
ever, more or less independent of each other until he seriously faced the 
apparent conflict between Marxism and Mach’s philosophical thought, as 
was represented by Lenin’s polemic against the latter in Materialism and 
Empirio-Criticism.2 He turned to the field of philosophy to tackle this issue, 
among others, by investigating Mach’s ideas and the philosophical implica-
tions of non-classical physics as well as by critically re-examining orthodox 
Marxism.3 This effort led the young Hiromatsu to the conviction that the 
changes in scientific thought introduced by Mach, Einstein, and a number 
of subsequent physicists have philosophically essential affinities with Marx’s 
1. hwc 15: xii–xiii, xvii.
2. Lenin 1909; see Hiromatsu 1995, 5: 289.
3. Hiromatsu 1995, 5: 294–5.
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innovations in social-historical thought, which he considered to have led 
the way in the critique of the modern world and its integral moment, mod-
ern philosophy. Renouncing the orthodox or “Russian” version of Marxism 
as an objectivist misrepresentation of Marx’s thought, he now set out to 
reconstruct and further develop the ideas of Marx and Engels. At the same 
time, he elaborated his views on Mach’s philosophy, relativity and quan-
tum theories, making explicit their achievements and their possible limits 
in challenging the modern philosophical framework. It is precisely where 
these two lines of endeavor converged that Hiromatsu’s philosophy took 
form and began to attract a wide audience in Japan during the late 1960’s—a 
period marked by a surge of popular protest against the established systems 
of society and knowledge.
This article focuses on Hiromatsu’s analysis of Mach’s philosophy and Ein-
stein’s relativity theory as a key component of his overall philosophical proj-
ect, without directly entering into the other hemisphere of his scholarship, 
the study of Marx and Marxism.4 I begin, in the first section, by outlining 
Hiromatsu’s analysis of Mach’s phenomenalist element-monism, specifically 
his critique of Mach’s insufficient break with modern philosophy. In the 
second section, I proceed to his philosophical inquiry into relativity theory 
with a focus on its intersubjective cognitive structure. In the third section, I 
discuss how his views on these themes are extended to a general ontological-
epistemological theory: the theory of the fourfold structure. While largely 
expository in nature, the present paper does contain critical considerations 
of my own. Toward the end of each of the first three sections, I point out 
some remaining questions, which all suggest a tension in Hiromatsu’s 
thought between the dimensions of synchronic structure and structuring 
movement. The fourth and final section is devoted to examining this issue, 
and to this end I will also briefly present my own interpretive approaches to 
Mach’s philosophy and relativity theory. 
4. For an English-language account of Hiromatsu’s work in connection with Mach’s thought, 
see Santone 1992. While Santone’s treatment of Hiromatsu is largely restricted to his views 
on the relation between Mach and relativity theory, the present study aims to approach the 
principal body of his philosophy in its aspect concerning physical-scientific knowledge. For a 
Japanese-language survey of Hiromatsu’s analysis of Mach’s philosophy and twentieth-century 
physics, see Noé 1982.
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Mach’s phenomenalism and its aporias
As co-translator of Ernst Mach’s major work Die Analyse der Emp-
findungen and other writings, the young Hiromatsu, along with the histo-
rian of science Hiroshige Tetsu 広重徹, contributed a great deal to a revival 
of interest in Mach’s thought in Japan.5 Yet his appraisal of Mach, while in 
large part positive, contains an incisive criticism—a criticism that essentially 
differs from the polemical attacks conducted by Lenin and his “orthodox” 
Marxist followers. Far from condemning Mach for denying objective real-
ity independent of the knowing subject and thus dissolving the modern 
subject / object dichotomy, Hiromatsu’s criticism is directed precisely at the 
insufficiency of his break with the modern philosophical framework.
In Hiromatsu’s view, the modern subject / object schema implies, among 
other notions, what he calls “the interiority of the given.”6 All that is 
immediately given to us is “the content of consciousness belonging to the 
subject.”7 This idea has been presupposed by most positions of modern 
philosophy, even though they are sharply opposed to one another. Under 
this premise, the realist “copy theory” proves to be self-contradictory 
as to the question of the accessibility of objective reality to the subject, 
whereas “idealism is logically consistent.”8 Far from supporting idealism, 
however, Hiromatsu rejects precisely that shared premise, the interiority 
of the given. It is against such a background that Hiromatsu turns his 
particular attention to phenomenalism, above all Ernst Mach’s element-
monism, which seeks to break with the presuppositions of modern phi-
losophy. He holds that while Mach’s philosophy as such is “untenable,” a 
close reexamination of it will provide “suitable clues to our radically going 
beyond the horizon of modern philosophy in general.”9 He accordingly 
sets out to analyze Mach’s ideas in his 1963 piece, “Mach’s Philosophy” 
「マッハの哲学」, written as the co-translator’s commentary attached to 
5. See Noé 1982, 203. The first wave of interest in Mach’s thought in modern Japan involved 
such thinkers as Kuwaki Ayao 桑木彧雄, Ishiwara Jun 石原純, and Tanabe Hajime 田辺元. See 
Tanaka 1992 and Santone 1992.
6. hwc 1: 16.
7. hwc 10: 270. 
8. hwc 10: 269.
9. hwc 3: 546, 525.
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the Japanese version of The Analysis of Sensations, and, with a more criti-
cal stance, in a chapter of his 1975 book Outpost to a Koto-Based Worldview 
『事的世界観への前哨』.10 Drawing on these texts, let us follow Hiromatsu 
in reviewing Mach’s philosophy and—prior to entering into his critical argu-
ments—survey his positive appraisal thereof.
Hiromatsu focuses first of all on Mach’s rejection of “the antithesis of 
subject and object” or “inside and outside”11—the epistemological frame-
work associated with Cartesian mind / body dualism. It is Mach’s basic the-
sis that the world consists of elements such as colors, sounds, smells, spaces 
and times, which are usually called “sensations.”12 Contrary to the conven-
tional notion that there are in the first place the bodily object and the ego, 
which interact with each other to produce sensations, Mach maintains that 
it is the sensuous elements which are the primary beings. These elements are 
connected with one another to form various complexes, and some of them 
exhibit relatively greater constancy. Bodies are nothing more than “names” 
for such relatively constant complexes of elements. As Mach puts it, “bodies 
do not produce sensations, but complexes of elements (complexes of sensa-
tions) make up bodies,” and “all bodies are but thought-symbols for com-
plexes of elements.”13
For Hiromatsu, it is no less crucial that Mach’s elements are not “subjec-
tive mental images” formed within our consciousness.14 Elements are, rather, 
neutral components of the world in the sense that they are “in themselves 
neither psychical nor physical,”15 and neither subjective nor objective. In 
contrast to orthodox Marxists, Hiromatsu sharply demarcates Mach’s posi-
tion from subjective idealism. Whereas the subjective idealist usually starts 
from the framework of the subject / object dichotomy, seeking merely to 
reduce the objective to the subjective, Mach, from the outset, dissolves that 
framework. In Mach’s view, what is called the subject or ego is, just like 
10. The latter text, entitled “Mach’s Phenomenalism and Meaningful Formations”「マッハの
現相主義と意味形象」, is included along with “Mach’s Philosophy” in hwc 3: 499–549.
11. Mach 1886, 278/341, 253/310; see hwc 3: 529. Numbers following a forward slash refer to 
pages in the English transltion as given in the concluding bibliography.
12. Mach 1886, 17 –8/ 22.
13. Mach 1886, 2 / 2, 23 / 29. 
14. hwc 3: 500.
15. Mach 1886, 51 / 62.
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the bodily object, nothing more than a relatively stable complex of inter-
connected elements. He states that “what is primary is not the ego, but the 
elements (sensations),” and that “the elements constitute the I.”16 Thus, in 
desubstantializing both the bodily object and the ego, Mach breaks with 
objective realism as well as subjective idealism.17
As Hiromatsu notes, Mach classifies the complexes of elements into sev-
eral groups: the “complexes of colors, sounds, and so forth, commonly called 
bodies” (abc…), “the complex known as our own body” (klm…), and “the 
complex composed of volitions, memory-images, and the rest” (αβγ…).18 
Mach’s grouping does not, however, uniquely determine the boundary 
between the ego and the “world of bodies.” Furthermore, the distinction 
between the above groups is not at all substantial, but thoroughly func-
tional. That is, not only are the elements of different groups dependent on 
each other, but also one and the same element—for instance, green—can 
appear as either physical or psychical, depending on the way in which it is 
considered in relation to other elements. This is the sense in which Mach 
claims that “there is but one kind of elements,” and that one has to deal only 
with the connections of elements.19
Mach, as Hiromatsu stresses, thus attaches great importance to the 
mutual dependence or “functional relations” of elements, in a sense even 
more than to elements themselves.20 This suggests that, although advocat-
ing element-monism, he is not an elementalist in the ordinary sense. Bound 
up with the above rejection of the subject / object dichotomy, this relationist 
16. Mach 1886, 19 / 23.
17. Hiromatsu acknowledges that Mach’s texts retain some remnants of the idealist influ-
ences he underwent in his early years (see hwc3: 544). Nevertheless—and this is his point—it 
is mistaken to regard Mach’s philosophy as a version of idealism. It may be noted in passing 
that Einstein, in 1916, also spoke against characterizing Mach as “a philosophical idealist and 
solipsist” (cpe 6: 281 / 145).
18. In his text, Mach first introduces klm… as a subgroup of abc…, and subsequently—in 
apparent inconsistency with this—treats the two groups as if they were juxtaposed. Hiromatsu 
seems to follow the latter procedure.
19. Mach 1886, 253/310. Here and elsewhere the translations cited in this article have been 
modified.
20. Mach 1886, 28/35; see hwc 3: 502. With regard to visual experience, for example, Mach 
notes: “It is not the elements of the complex, but the whole physiologico-optical complex that is 
of importance” (1886, 170 / 208).
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tendency, in a manner anticipating Ernst Cassirer’s work, guides all his “anti-
metaphysical” arguments. This is manifest not least in his critical analysis of 
classical physics, particularly of Newtonian mechanics.
In Hiromatsu’s view, Mach’s critique of Newtonian mechanics deserves 
all the more attention because it paved the way for Einstein’s relativity 
theory. Newtonian physics had, as Hiromatsu succinctly puts it, gener-
ally rested on the notion that “bodies as [material] substances, residing in 
absolute space and time, exercise causal effects on one another” to produce 
a variety of phenomena.21 In contrast, he continues, Mach deprives space 
and time, matter and force, and other physical beings of their self-contained 
character, and reconceives them as relations of phenomena or, ultimately, 
of sensuous elements. This implies, in the methodological dimension, the 
necessity of defining physical concepts through coordinating physical phe-
nomena to one another, that is, through operational procedures. Specifically, 
Mach rejects the notions of absolute space and absolute time, maintaining 
that mechanics can only deal with the “relative positions and motions of 
bodies.”22 He also criticizes the Newtonian notion of inertial mass as “quan-
tity of matter,” redefining it operationally in terms of “dynamical relations of 
bodies.”23 He further suggests that the inertia of a physical body is due to its 
interaction with the rest of the universe. As for causality, he seeks to replace 
the concept of cause with the concept of “the dependence of the character-
istics of phenomena on one another,” and hence with “the mathematical 
concept of function.”24 In sum, Mach maintains that the task of physical sci-
ence is to describe “the functional dependence of sensuous elements on one 
another,” which amounts to setting up “equations of the form f (a,b,c,…) = 
0.”25 With this conceptual orientation, his views of physical science, as we 
will see in the next section, mark a crucial step toward Einstein’s theory of 
relativity.
Hiromatsu also favors, though only provisionally, Mach’s general 
approach to knowledge or cognition. “When he discusses knowledge,” 
21. hwc 3: 536.
22. Mach 1883, 223/280.
23. Mach 1883, 210/265, 239/300; see hwc 3: 420. 
24. Mach 1886, 74 / 89. 
25. Mach 1886, 301 / 369, 37 / 45; see hwc 3: 519.
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Hiromatsu remarks, Mach might “seem to return from monism to a naive 
dualism and even to adopt the conventional copy theory.” Yet, he continues, 
this is no more than a “superficial impression.”26 While characterizing cog-
nition as a form of biological adaptation through “copying” (Abbildung)—
reproduction or anticipation—of facts in thought, Mach does not mean by 
“copying” a subjective representation of the objective, but a representation 
of sensuous elements by other sensuous elements (of the group αβγ…). This 
enables him to avoid “the aporia of the copy theory,” which is rooted in the 
subject / object dichotomy.27 As Hiromatsu also notes, although he belongs 
to the empiricist camp, Mach breaks with the traditional view of concept for-
mation as a process of induction or abstraction.28 According to Mach, a con-
cept is nothing other than an impulse to perform sensuous activity, which 
“produces new sensuous elements.”29 In conceptual processes, “partially 
observed facts” are thus supplemented by representations and thoughts.30 
Specifically, judgment consists in “a supplementation (Ergänzung) of sen-
suous presentations (Vorstellungen) by other sensuous presentations”—a 
circumstance that makes possible the “economical description” of facts.31 
Moreover, such a process of supplementation is at work not only in highly 
conceptual thought, but rather in all modes of cognition, including percep-
tion. Thus, while characterized as a copying of facts, cognition is for Mach 
not a simple reception of already existing data, but in a sense a “construc-
tive” activity.32
So far we have followed Hiromatsu in surveying Mach’s philosophical 
views with a focus on the points he considers particularly important. To be 
sure, Hiromatsu does not ignore the significance of such ideas of Mach as 
the descriptionist view of scientific laws or the biological conception of the 
“economy of thought.” Yet these ideas are, as he sees it, no more than sec-
ondary to, and derivative from, Mach’s basic tenet that the world consists of 
26. hwc 3: 508.
27. hwc 3: 510.
28. Elsewhere Hiromatsu elaborates his own critique of this abstraction theory (hwc 15: 
263ff.).
29. Mach 1886, 264 / 323.
30. Mach 1905, 3 / 2.
31. Mach 1886, 259/317–8, 40/49.
32. hwc 3: 510.
katsumori: hiromatsu on mach and relativity Theory | 157
“functionally interconnected sensuous elements.”33 He highly evaluates this 
basic view of Mach insofar as it implies a departure from the substantialism 
and subject / object dichotomy of modern philosophy.
Nevertheless, Hiromatsu is in no way an adherent of Mach. For all his 
positive appraisal up to this point, he in due course turns his critical gaze on 
what he calls “the aporias of Mach’s philosophy.” He starts by asking: Are 
the complexes and relations of elements, which Mach regards as so impor-
tant, “themselves elements, sensations?”34 While Mach leaves this question 
unanswered, Hiromatsu maintains that the relations of sensuous elements 
are themselves not purely sensuous, and that, without introducing such a 
non-sensuous moment into phenomena, Mach could not “fill up the gap 
between the actual world and the aggregation of elements.” However, pre-
cisely this introduction of something that is non-sensuous and yet constitu-
tive of the phenomenal world may “lead to a self-destruction of the Machian 
monism of sensuous elements.”35
Hiromatsu further argues that Mach’s sensuous elements themselves 
prove to be no more purely sensuous than their relations. In his classification 
of elements into the three groups abc…, klm…, and αβγ…, Mach, when 
necessary, also introduces the following subgroups of elements: “the bod-
ies of other persons” kʹlʹmʹ…, kʺlʺmʺ… and their contents of consciousness 
αʹβʹγʹ…, αʺβʺγʺ….36 As Hiromatsu points out, however, as regards abc…, 
Mach “considers that they appear to other persons just as they are, and does 
not allow of subgroups with primes.” That is to say, for instance, the red 
color of an apple as I see it constitutes a basic element for other persons as 
well. In other words, what Mach calls red is something valid to different per-
sons, hence already “endowed with the meaning ‘redness’” which counts as 
the same despite its different perspectival appearances.37 Thus, Hiromatsu 
contends: 
33. hwc 3: 542–3.
34. hwc 3: 502. See a parallel question posed by neo-Kantian philosopher Richard Hönigs-
wald (1903, 20).
35. hwc 3: 543.
36. mach 1886, 12/9. 
37. On this point, some qualifying comments may be in order. Mach’s failure to introduce 
the notations of aʹbʹcʹ…, aʺb c̋ʺ… does not immediately mean that he altogether ignores per-
spectival differences concerning abc…. Rather, he argues that “abc… are always dependent 
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We must point out as Mach’s self-deception affecting the very basis of his 
worldview that… with regard to the elements abc… as givens which are 
sharable with other persons, he actually posits them, not as mere sensuous 
elements, but as meaningful formations preconceived as intersubjectively 
identical.38 
Mach is unaware of his de facto introduction of such non-sensuous mean-
ings, which in reality are constitutive of the phenomenal world. While Mach 
rightly rejects the traditional hypostatization or, in Hiromatsu’s terminol-
ogy, “reification” of meaning into essence or substance, he fails to grasp the 
“ideal meaningful moments” of phenomena.39
Summing up his critical argument so far, Hiromatsu restates that Mach’s 
element-monism—contrary to its own basic claims—rests on an unwitting 
introduction not only of the non-sensuous relations of elements, but also of 
the non-sensuous, intersubjectively identical meanings as integral moments 
of elements themselves. His criticism is, however, not only directed at 
internal inconsistencies of Mach’s thought. Rather, Hiromatsu further 
argues that precisely Mach’s presupposition of these transpersonal mean-
ings prevents him from considering the way in which meanings are formed 
through “linguistic intercourse” between individuals.40 Consequently, 
Mach supposes the elements abc… not to be formed through communi-
cative processes, but to “subsist trans-historically, independently of human 
activities.” Correlatively, he takes for granted an “original isomorphism of 
knowing subjects,” overlooking the way in which they become isomorphic. 
In short, he misses the essentially “historical and social” dimension of the 
on klm…,” and that this is the reason why in physics we need to remove “the accidental influ-
ence of the variations of klm… etc.” in order to attain “the pure dependence of abc… on one 
another” (Mach 1886, 281). Yet, for Mach, the dependence of abc… on klm… no more than 
modifies abc…, and the self-identity of abc… is assumed prior to comparison between their 
different perspectival appearances. To this extent, Hiromatsu’s critical observation seems valid.
38. hwc 3: 545.
39. hwc 3: 546.
40. As was suggested above, Mach does not entirely fail to consider the process through which 
phenomena are intersubjectified. As Hiromatsu mentions (see hwc 3: 517), Mach at times dis-
cusses the way in which “experiences of many persons” become integrated through communica-
tion in accordance with the economy of thought (Mach 1896, 228; cf. 1905, 128 / 93). Neverthe-
less—and this is the point of Hiromatsu’s critique—Mach conceives the basic components of 
experiences, namely sensuous elements, as prior to any intersubjective mediation.
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phenomenal world. These flaws, Hiromatsu concludes, in the final analysis 
prevents Mach’s thought from fully going beyond “the horizon of modern 
philosophy.”41 
We can see that Hiromatsu’s critique of Mach as traced so far has gone 
through at least two consecutive phases of argumentation. First, and for 
the greater part, his criticism is—more or less similarly to neo-Kantian and 
Husserlian critiques—aimed at Mach’s empiricist disregard of non-sen-
suous, intersubjectively valid meanings, with which he cannot in fact dis-
pense. While proceeding in what might be called a “deconstructive” strategy 
in which Mach’s philosophy is set against itself, this phase of the critique 
is largely restricted to the dimension of the synchronic structure of phe-
nomena. Second, Hiromatsu goes on to point out that Mach—perhaps like 
most other philosophers up until his time—neglects the manner in which 
phenomena are endowed with intersubjective meanings through processes of 
human intercourse. This criticism, which is as such methodologically rather 
external, is concerned with the dynamic dimension in which phenomena 
are structured.
It should be noted, however, that these two phases of the critique are not 
explicitly distinguished by Hiromatsu himself, their relationship thus being 
left unspecified. Here there may arise the question: Does not speaking of the 
formation of intersubjectively identical meanings imply that there are cir-
cumstances in which such meanings have not yet been formed and, correla-
tively, the knowing subjects not yet made isomorphic? Does it not follow, 
then, that the first phase of his critique is concerned solely with, and valid 
only for, the limited case in which the process of intersubjectification has 
already been completed? We will see later that this kind of tension between 
the two dimensions, synchronic structure and structuring process, recurs—
beyond the thematic concerning Mach’s thought—in different forms 
throughout Hiromatsu’s philosophical work. For the moment, however, let 
us leave this issue on one side and turn to his analysis of relativity theory, a 
theory which, in his view, moves further than Mach’s thought in breaking 
with the modern philosophical framework. 
41. hwc 3: 548–9.
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Relativity theory and intersubjectivity
In his project of going beyond the modern worldview and specifi-
cally of surpassing the limits of Mach’s philosophy, Hiromatsu attaches great 
importance to Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity. He gained from this 
theory—in a sense more than from quantum mechanics42—a crucial insight 
into the problems of meaning and intersubjectivity, the very issues around 
which his critique of Mach was seen to revolve. Among many natural-sci-
entific theories, it is arguably this theory of Einstein that played the most 
important role for Hiromatsu’s overall philosophical project. In what fol-
lows, let us survey his philosophical analysis of relativity theory as it is pre-
sented in a section of the book Outpost to a Koto-Based Worldview and more 
elaborately in The Philosophy of Relativity Theory 『相対性理論の哲学』.43
Hiromatsu begins with the methodological aspect of relativity theory, 
specifying both its affinities with and departures from Mach’s ideas. Ein-
stein, argues Hiromatsu, largely follows Mach in the “individual proce-
dures” of concept formation, which rest on the view that “concepts and 
conceptual systems are made legitimate only by their serving for the over-
view of complexes of experiences.”44 He thus starts from the Machian cri-
tique of the Newtonian notions of absolute space and absolute time as well 
as of mass as the inner substance of the body, and, more generally, proceeds 
with the operational definition of physical concepts as it had been advo-
cated by Mach.45 This is exemplified by his definition, in special relativity, 
of the simultaneity of spatially distant events. Einstein’s debt to Mach in this 
respect is thus not only attested to by his autobiographical remarks, but can 
also be ascertained through analysis of his scientific work. In other words, 
there is indeed a sense in which Mach’s views on physical science served as “a 
direct forerunner of relativity theory.”46
42. Hiromatsu’s philosophical analysis of quantum physics is in hwc 3: 137–230, 290–343.
43. These texts are included in hwc 3: 277–90, 361–416. It is also worth noting that the first 
edition of The Philosophy of Relativity Theory was co-authored with Itagaki Ryōichi 板垣良一, 
who wrote the third chapter.
44. cpe 7: 2/2; see also hwc, 3: 435. 
45. Analyzing each of Mach’s concepts of mass, space, time, and mechanical laws, Hiromatsu 
examines how they, combined together, prefigure Einstein’s view of nature in relativity theory 
(hwc 3: 417–46).
46. hwc 3: 417. 
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However, Einstein’s method is not altogether Machian. According to 
Hiromatsu, Einstein diverges from Mach in the overall methodology of 
theory construction. That is, while Mach aims at an abridged description of 
sensuous phenomena, Einstein prefers a deductive path starting from basic 
principles. This difference between the two thinkers, while growing larger 
in Einstein’s later years, “can be perceived consistently” from the beginning 
of his scientific career. In certain respects, Hiromatsu continues, Einstein’s 
method may even be linked to Kantian philosophy. His derivation of the 
Lorentz transformation, in particular, can in a sense be characterized as a 
quasi-Kantian determination of the “conditions of possibility” of the experi-
mental facts expressed by the two basic principles—the principle of relativ-
ity and the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light.47 This being 
the case, relativity theory cannot uniquely be associated with either Machian 
or Kantian philosophy. This is not at all to say, however, that the theory is 
philosophically eclectic. Rather, Hiromatsu suggests the possibility that rel-
ativity theory goes beyond the very “horizon” within which Machian empir-
icism and Kantian transcendentalism, among other doctrines, are opposed 
to each other.48 To examine this possibility, he subsequently focuses on the 
ontological, and then on the epistemological dimension of the theory.
The ontological dimension of relativity theory, Hiromatsu argues, is con-
cerned with its rejection of substantialist notions underlying classical phys-
ics. As is well known, in the special theory of relativity, space and time are 
shown to be dependent on each other, as expressed quantitatively by the 
Lorentz transformation, and the mass of the body dependent on the velocity 
of motion relative to the system of reference. Yet space-time in special rela-
tivity, while conditioning the motion of material bodies, is not itself condi-
tioned by matter. A new situation arises in general relativity, however, where 
gravitation, equivalent to the acceleration of the reference system, is not 
simply an action on bodies in space-time, but is itself just another expres-
sion for the properties of space-time. In consequence, space-time is no lon-
ger independent of matter, but is conditioned by matter via the gravitational 
field.49 We can thus see how space and time in special relativity, and then 
47. hwc 3: 371–2.
48. hwc 3: 373.
49. See hwc 3: 281.
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space-time and matter in general relativity, are each no longer conceived as 
self-contained in character, but are reformulated as interdependent terms of 
functional relations.
Here it is crucial to Hiromatsu that these functional relations are not 
secondary or external to the terms related. In Newtonian mechanics, space, 
time, matter, and force had been treated as if each of them were a “pri-
mary entity,” the relations between them remaining external. In relativity 
theory, however, relation is prior to, and constitutive of, the terms related. 
As regards special relativity, “it is not that there are in the first place two 
things, space and time, which post factum enter into a relation to each other, 
but that their relation is the primary, basic being.”50 This relationist inter-
pretation by Hiromatsu might seem to resemble mathematician Herman 
Minkowski’s ontological account of his four-dimensional reformulation of 
special relativity.51 When, however, Minkowski remarks that “space for itself 
(für sich) and time for itself are to sink completely into shadows, and only a 
kind of union of the two is to preserve independence,”52 he tends to hypos-
tatize space-time as a whole. Hiromatsu’s departure from this Minkowskian 
interpretation is not explicitly stated by himself, yet implied in his general 
philosophical orientation. That is, rejecting the hypostatization of the whole 
as a version of substantialism, he underlines “the primacy of relation” itself.53 
It is, in Hiromatsu’s view, with this “relationist world picture” that relativ-
ity theory represents a significant shift in the history of physical-scientific 
thought.
This ontological innovation alone, however, would not render relativity 
theory fully revolutionary. As mentioned earlier, Mach had already criti-
cized the hypostatized notions of space, time, matter, and force, and reinter-
50. hwc 3: 388.
51. Shortly after Einstein presented special relativity, Minkowski developed a mathematical 
reformulation of the theory in which time is treated as formally equivalent to the space coordi-
nates and the Lorentz transformation is represented as a kind of geometrical rotation in four-
dimensional space-time. Einstein was initially unimpressed by this Minkowskian interpreta-
tion, but came to adopt its four-dimensional formalism in the course of generalizing relativity 
theory. This does not mean, however, that Einstein’s understanding of relativity theory came to 
accord philosophically with Minkowski’s. See Katsumori 1992, 570–1.
52. Minkowski 1909, 104 / 75.
53. hwc 3: 359. Elsewhere Hiromatsu develops his critique of the hypostatization of the 
whole in contexts outside physical science (see hwc 10: 525ff., 16: 282).
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preted them as relations of sensuous phenomena, anticipating, in particular, 
Einstein’s general-relativistic conception of space-time as what Hiromatsu 
calls “material space or spatial matter.”54 Furthermore, among Einstein’s con-
temporaries, such thinkers as Machian philosopher Joseph Petzoldt and, 
to a greater extent, neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer thematized and favorably 
assessed the way in which relativity theory had replaced the Newtonian sub-
stance-concepts with concepts of functional relations. The relationist ten-
dency of relativity theory was thus, in one way or another, accommodated 
to Machism and to a version of neo-Kantianism, neither of which, in Hiro-
matsu’s view, fully goes beyond the modern philosophical framework.
It is rather, Hiromatsu holds, by virtue of its epistemological relevance 
that the relationist mode of thought of relativity theory gains its novelty. 
This epistemological dimension centers around what he calls “the problem 
of observation.” In other words, not only the relation between objects is at 
issue, but the relation between, and involving, observing subjects as well. In 
special relativity, as Einstein shows, “two events that are simultaneous when 
viewed from a particular coordinate system can no longer be considered as 
simultaneous events when viewed from a system that is moving relatively to 
that system.”55 
Similar to the notion of simultaneity, such quantities as length, time 
interval, and mass also prove to be no longer invariable, but relative to the 
state of motion of the observing system. By this relativity, however, it is not 
merely meant that the result of measurement is dependent on the observing 
system, but also, and more importantly, that the results obtained in differ-
ent systems are all equally legitimate, none of them being privileged over the 
others.56 Yet, as Hiromatsu stresses, this in no way leads to a “sheer relativ-
ism.” What is crucial is, rather, that two (or more) different observers, while 
obtaining different results of measurement, come to view them syntheti-
cally in a common meaning. In Hiromatsu’s terminology, the observers each 
54. hwc 3: 392. 
55. cpe 2: 282/145.
56. For provisional convenience, Hiromatsu here presupposes the identity of the observed 
object for different observers. This issue of the intersubjective identity of the object constitutes, 
however, a theme of his later discussions in the Outpost to a Koto-Based Worldview, where he re-
conceives the identical object as an intersubjective construct which is formed in the framework 
of the fourfold structure (see hwc 3: 307–14).
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grasp the “phenomenon-for-the-self ” and “phenomenon-for-the-other” in 
just one and the same intersubjective meaning.57 
Such a structure of intersubjectivity is, as Hiromatsu notes, already con-
stitutive of knowledge in Newtonian physics and also of our everyday expe-
rience—as, for instance, when we take what is a triangle for me and a circle 
for another to be different perspectival appearances (Abschattungen) of one 
and the same cone. Yet this state of affairs had traditionally been more or 
less concealed by the notion of independent objective reality and that of a 
privileged subjective standpoint (such as that of the absolutely resting sys-
tem) from which that reality can be correctly grasped. To be sure, as we saw 
in the previous section, Mach had rejected this subject / object dichotomy, 
conceiving the phenomenal world instead as consisting of neutral sensu-
ous elements. Nevertheless, to repeat Hiromatsu’s criticism, he had failed to 
recognize the intersubjectivity of meaning as an integral moment of phe-
nomena. Rather than thematizing the question of intersubjectivity, Mach 
had unwittingly presupposed an intersubjective unity of experiences prior 
to their perspectival differences. For example, about the geocentric and the 
heliocentric systems of the universe, Mach notes that “the universe is not 
twice given, with an earth at rest and an earth in motion; but only once, 
with its relative motions, alone determinable.”58 This remark, not cited by 
Hiromatsu, could serve as a succinct illustration of the differences at issue 
between the orientations of Mach and Einstein. Unlike Mach’s line of 
thought, relativity theory focuses precisely on the way in which the differ-
ent experiences of different observers are intersubjectified. It is in this sense, 
Hiromatsu holds, that, with relativity theory, the question of intersubjectiv-
ity has first been made manifest in the history of physical science.59
Hiromatsu qualifies this point, however, by saying that the above episte-
mological dimension of relativity theory is an implication found by us, and 
does not coincide with Einstein’s own understanding of the matter. Einstein 
himself, in Hiromatsu’s account, embraced more traditional philosophical 
ideas, and was not fully free, in particular, of the notion of objective real-
ity independent of the subject. When comparing various results of measure-
57. hwc 3: 284.
58. Mach 1883, 226 / 284.
59. hwc 3: 284.
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ment obtained in different reference systems, “he was inclined to regard as 
real the states of affairs corresponding to the observations made from the 
system to which the object belongs.”60 Einstein was thus not fully aware of 
what his theory actually achieved in the philosophical dimension. Stated 
otherwise, Hiromatsu’s account of relativity theory in terms of intersubjec-
tivity is a reconstructive work from his own philosophical point of view, not 
from Einstein’s.
It appears to me, however, that Einstein himself, in a certain phase of his 
career, came closer to the Hiromatsuan notion of intersubjectivity—with 
regard to relativity theory as well as in a more general epistemological con-
text. This is attested to by the opening passages of his 1921 Princeton lec-
tures (published in 1922 as Vier Vorlesungen über Relativitätstheorie), which 
Hiromatsu could have cited in support of his interpretation. Einstein begins 
by pointing out that any experience at first belongs to the individual, and is 
thus subjective.61 A step toward scientific cognition is taken, however, when, 
with the aid of language, different persons compare their experiences. What 
is crucial here is that “to those sensuous experiences [of different persons] 
which correspond to each other and are therefore in a sense transpersonal 
(überpersönlich), one attributes in thought a reality.”62 This is the way in 
which one forms the concept of the physical body and other concepts refer-
ring to experiences that allow mutual correspondence between individuals. 
In special relativity, Einstein continues, the definition of simultaneity posits 
a unique time valid to all observers in a single inertial system, thus endowing 
60. hwc 3: 412. This remark by Hiromatsu seems to be questionable in light of Einstein’s 
debate in 1911 with mathematician V. Varičak on the contraction of moving bodies. While 
Varičak (1911, 169) maintained that, in Einstein’s theory, the contraction is “an apparent, subjec-
tive phenomenon,” Einstein rejected this interpretation by saying that “the question of whether 
the Lorentz contraction really (wirklich) exists or not is misleading.” The contraction, he con-
tinues, “does not ‘really’ exist insofar as it does not exist for an observer moving with the body,” 
while “it does ‘really’ exist—that is, in such a way that it could in principle be demonstrated by 
physical means—for an observer not moving with the body” (cpe 3: 482–3). We can thus see 
that as far as the Lorentz contraction is concerned, Einstein considered the different results of 
measurement obtained by different observers to be equally real (see Pais 1982, 144).
61. On this point, Hiromatsu would not agree with Einstein, holding instead that there is 
from the outset a structure of intersubjectivity or, to put it more dynamically, that the process 
of intersubjectification has always already begun.
62. Einstein 1922, 1/2 (cpe 7: 500). 
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the result of the space-time measurement with some “physically real” mean-
ing.63 Proceeding to the situation that concerns the relations between differ-
ent inertial systems, however, one must seek physical reality in the validity of 
the concepts for all those systems. What is now considered real is therefore 
no longer the point in space or the instant in time at which an event occurs, 
but rather the event itself, or the corresponding space-time point, which is 
invariant with respect to the choice of the system.64 This Einsteinian notion 
of “transpersonal” validity as constitutive of knowledge in general and of 
concept formation in special relativity in particular—a view that would 
largely disappear in the later Einstein—prefigures to some extent the notion 
of intersubjectivity around which Hiromatsu’s interpretation revolves. 
Conversely speaking, Hiromatsu’s epistemological understanding of relativ-
ity theory proves to be more in line with Einstein’s own at the time than 
Hiromatsu himself supposes.
With this consideration in mind, let us look somewhat more closely at 
Hiromatsu’s analysis which primarily refers to special relativity and yet, in 
his view, also applies to general relativity. Restricting himself to the relation 
of two observers who belong to different systems, Hiromatsu gives a pre-
liminary warning: It would be misguided to suppose that only one of the 
observers needs to perform actual measurement, and that, by the use of the 
transformation equations, we can indirectly obtain the possible results of 
measurement for the other observer as well, thus rendering their (possible) 
experiences intersubjective. This contains a petitio principii, for the coor-
dinate transformation is available not prior to, but as a result of, the very 
process through which knowledge is intersubjectified. This being the case, it 
must be that both observers begin by carrying out measurement, then report 
their results to each other. Only thus is it possible for the observers to pro-
ceed through “communication and mutual understanding,” and finally to 
set up the coordinate transformation.65
Hiromatsu goes on to argue that the observers, each aware of a pair of 
phenomena, the “phenomenon-for-the-self ” and the “phenomenon-for-
the-other”—or linguistic representations thereof—recognize not only the 
63. Einstein 1922, 19 / 29 (cpe 7: 518).
64. Einstein 1922, 20 / 30 (cpe 7: 519).
65. hwc 3: 288.
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difference between the two phenomena, but also the fact that the manner 
in which they differ for one of the observers is “conjugate” with that for 
the other.66 This knowledge is gained through each observer’s assuming in 
thought the other’s observational standpoint, while at the same time retain-
ing her / his own. This leads, as we saw earlier in a preliminary account, to the 
following situation: 
The two observers, who have as givens the immediate phenomenon-for-the-
self and the phenomenon-for-the-other…, each posit these two givens in an 
intersubjectively identical meaning, and thereby conceive them as perspec-
tival appearances of an intersubjectively unitary given….67 
This “identical meaning” corresponds mathematically to the coordinate 
transformation equations. Here we can see, stresses Hiromatsu, that each of 
the phenomena appears to the observers, not simply as an immediate given, 
but as something more or something else, something meaningful. Thus the 
“known” side of the phenomena is of a twofold character, which is to say 
that it consists of both a phenomenal and a meaningful moment. While the 
meaningful moment may be called “objective,” it is not that it is free from 
subjective factors, but that it is intersubjectively valid precisely by virtue of 
its internal relation to the observing subjects or “knowers.”
These observers, Hiromatsu continues, in positing the common mean-
ing, transform themselves into intersubjectively isomorphic knowers. Each 
of them is “no longer a mere being-for-oneself, but a being-for-oneself as 
being-for-another or a being-for-another as being-for-oneself,” thus exhib-
iting a “twofold structure of self-dividing unity.” In this way, not only the 
known side, but also the knowing side of phenomena proves to be twofold. 
We now see, as Hiromatsu concludes, that these two sides are bound up 
with each other to form a “fourfold structural relation”: The observed given 
is valid as something more (or something else) for the observer as someone 
more (or someone else).68 This is Hiromatsu’s final formulation of the cogni-
tive structure of relativity theory, and it constitutes a particular and typical 
66. hwc 3: 401.
67. hwc 3: 403. The original Japanese for “meaning” here is 意味的所知, which might liter-
ally be rendered as “the meaningful known.” In Hiromatsu’s later work, represented by Being 
and Meaning, this term is renamed 意味的所識, as we shall see in the following section.
68. hwc 3: 403.
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case of the general fourfold structure of phenomena, which will be the main 
subject of the next section.
Having surveyed Hiromatsu’s philosophical analysis of relativity theory, 
we can see, on the one hand, that this analysis is not entirely restricted to 
the framework of synchronic structure, but at times refers to the process 
through which phenomena are intersubjectively structured. Specifically, as 
opposed to the Machian presupposition of the intersubjective unity of expe-
riences and to the possible misconception of relativity theory that begs the 
question of how knowledge is intersubjectified, Hiromatsu emphasizes the 
indispensability of the process of “mutual understanding” of the observers.
 On the other hand, it seems to me that his epistemological analysis 
tends to be reducible to an account of the very result of the communicative 
process. After mentioning the situation in which the two observers imagi-
natively take each other’s standpoint, Hiromatsu passes on directly (with 
apparent smoothness) to the final state in which the observers as inter-
subjective knowers share a single meaning. Focusing on this final state, he 
leaves the transition from the former to the latter largely unspecified. Here 
we encounter the same kind of issue pointed out earlier with regard to his 
critique of Mach’s thought. As I will suggest later, this issue is also bound 
up with the fact that Hiromatsu appears to underestimate the differences in 
philosophical conception between the two theories of relativity as well as 
the differences between Einstein’s earlier and later philosophical thinking. 
Before returning to these questions, however, I wish to sketch out Hiroma-
tsu’s general philosophical framework, which will provide a proper perspec-
tive on what we have seen so far in this article. 
The theory of the fourfold structure
Hiromatsu’s overall philosophical project revolves around the 
theory of what he calls the fourfold structure (四肢構造), which he devel-
oped in his 1972 book The Intersubjective Being-Structure of the World『世界
の共同主観的存在構造』and several subsequent works, most elaborately in 
Being and Meaning 『存在と意味』(1982, 1993). In this theory, he sets him-
self the task of a primarily “synchronic” structural analysis of the phenom-
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enal world as it unfolds in both cognitive and practical dimensions.69 Since 
the present study is mostly concerned with cognitive issues, we will largely 
restrict ourselves to his account of the “cognitive world,” that is, the world 
“in a provisional abstraction from such moments as practical significance or 
value significance.”70
Hiromatsu rejects the subject / object schema underlying modern phi-
losophy in general, and, like Mach, conceives phenomena as neither simply 
subjective nor purely objective, but prior to the very division of subject and 
object. Yet, as we have seen earlier, he breaks with Machian phenomenal-
ism to the extent that Mach remains unaware of the “meaningful moment” 
of phenomena. Rather, in a manner reminiscent of phenomenology, Hiro-
matsu stresses that all phenomena bear meaning. His basic claim is as fol-
lows: 
The phenomenon always already appears in itself as something more than a 
mere ‘sensuous’ given. The sound that is just heard appears intuitively as a car 
horn, and what is seen outside the window, as a pine tree.71 
This applies not only to perceptions, but to all kinds of phenomena includ-
ing representations and linguistically mediated judgments. All these 
phenomena appear as something more or something other than “the phe-
nomenal given” (現相的所与). In other words, the phenomenon is such that, 
“in showing itself…, it always already shows something else.” Hiromatsu des-
ignates this something more or something else as “the meaningful cognized” 
(意味的所識) or simply the “meaning.”72 Any phenomenon thus consists of 
these two factors, given and meaning, linked to each other in such a way 
that the former appears as the latter. If we denote the phenomenal given by 
p and the meaningful cognized by [p], the mode of being of phenomena 
may thus be expressed as: p as [p]. This as-connection constitutes “the fun-
69. The first and the second volumes of Being and Meaning are devoted to an analysis of the 
cognitive and the practical dimensions, respectively.
70. hwc 15: 5. Far from granting a fundamental priority to the cognitive over the practical, 
Hiromatsu notes that “the cognitive world is nothing more than a structural moment or per-
spectival cross-section of the practical world” (hwc 15: xvii). Yet, in order to confront squarely 
the modern philosophical tradition, which has primarily been concerned with the cognitive 
dimension, he finds it convenient to start with this dimension.
71. hwc 1: 33.
72. hwc 15: 39, 1: 34. 
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damental unity of ‘otherness’ (difference) and ‘sameness’ (identity)” of the 
two factors.73 
This twofold or dual structure of phenomena, Hiromatsu continues, is 
“manifest most typically in the case of signs,” such as a series of sounds or ink 
stains appearing as a meaningful word. Yet this twofoldness is not unique 
to what are commonly called signs, but, conversely, all phenomena are, in a 
sense, “of a signitive (symbolic) character.”74 It is precisely by virtue of this 
general character of phenomena that signs in the narrow sense can function 
as signs. From this point of view, Hiromatsu renames the phenomenal given 
the “signifier” and the meaningful cognized the “signified,” and character-
izes their as-connection as a “symbolic combination.”75 
While breaking with Machian monism and emphasizing the twofold 
character of phenomena, Hiromatsu in no way maintains a dualism of mutu-
ally independent terms. On the contrary, he seeks to de-substantialize the 
two moments of phenomena by what may, in a sense, be characterized as an 
extension of the Saussurian view of signs to all phenomena. First, he argues 
that not only are all phenomena meaningful, but also any meaning (or signi-
fied) exists only to the extent that it is tied to, or, as it were, “incarnated” in 
a phenomenal given (or signifier).76 In other words, far from being self-con-
tained entities, both the given and the meaning can be what they are only in 
their interrelation. Second, Hiromatsu points to the differential character of 
meaning: It is not that the meaning A is distinguished from non-A because 
of A’s independent self-identity, but that “A is taken… as self-identical inso-
far as it is distinguished from non-A.”77 In this way, with regard both to the 
relation between given and meaning and to the relation between different 
meanings, he offers a radically “relationist” account, rejecting the reifying 
notion of meaning as self-contained.
Hiromatsu goes on to determine more closely the character of the mean-
73. Here I have drawn on Hiromatsu’s notation employed elsewhere for Karl Marx’s con-
cepts of use-value and value of commodities, which, in his reading, exemplify two factors of the 
phenomenon in the practical domain, corresponding respectively to given and meaning under 
discussion here (see hwc 12: 148, 13: 255).
74. hwc 1: 34. 
75. hwc 15: 149.
76. hwc 1: 36. 
77. hwc 15: 26.
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ingful cognized. Meaning is neither a “real object” referred to, nor a “men-
tal image” associated with the phenomenal given. For what are called real 
objects as well as mental images are themselves phenomena, already con-
sisting of the two moments of given and meaning. Rather, meaning is, if 
considered as such, marked by its “ideal” character. The meaning (e.g. tree), 
as which a series of phenomenal givens (that pine, this cedar, etc.) equally 
appear, exhibits a “universal, trans-spatial, and invariable,” in short, “ideal” 
character, whereas the given is “individual, local, and variable,” that is, 
“real.”78 It is crucial to note, however, that this ideality of meaning holds 
only insofar as one attempts in thought to “isolate” the meaning from the 
whole phenomenon and to “treat it as if it were an independent term.” In 
other words, as Hiromatsu admits, his characterization of meaning as ideal 
contains a kind of “reification”—a critical and self-critical insight that marks 
his decisive break with Husserlian phenomenology.79 In an effort to avoid 
this reification, Hiromatsu reformulates the meaning as “functional,” in the 
sense of the mathematical function into which specific values—correspond-
ing to phenomenal givens—are each time inserted.80 He holds this analogy 
to be appropriate insofar as the function is not considered in separation 
from the specific values it takes.
This motif of criticizing reification further leads Hiromatsu into a certain 
relativization of the given / cognized distinction itself. He points to the pos-
sibility of the “manifold process” or “multi-layered structure” in which “the 
given-cognized formation at one level… stands in the position of a given in 
relation to a higher-level meaningful cognized.”81 Stated conversely, the phe-
nomenal given at any level can be a twofold formation at a lower level. In the 
series of such different levels, he continues, “there is no fixed, unique low-
est-level given.”82 For, as soon as one is conscious of the phenomenal given 
as such, this can no longer be a pure given, but is already known as some-
thing. This last point may serve as a crucial argument against the adequacy 
of Machian phenomenalism, since it gives the essential reason why Machian 
78. hwc 15: 21. 
79. hwc 15: 17. 
80. hwc 15: 22.
81. hwc 1: 45, 15: 7. 
82. hwc 15: 8. 
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sensuous elements—as well as what positivists call “sense data”—are not an 
ultimate given, but already assume the duality of given and meaning.83
So far, Hiromatsu has restricted himself to the “known” side of phe-
nomena in a provisional abstraction from the subjective or “knowing” 
side. Yet, as he points out, a phenomenon is every time a phenomenon “for 
someone,”84 and this someone—the “knower” (能知)—is, like “the known” 
(所知), also twofold in character.85 In the previous section, we focused on 
Hiromatsu’s account of how, in relativity theory, two observers assume in 
thought each other’s observational standpoint, thus each of them being in a 
state of “self-dividing unity.” He now gives another example: When “a child 
sees a cow and says ‘doggie,’” it is indeed to the child, not to me, that the 
phenomenon appears as a “doggie.” Yet, “without in a sense taking a cow 
as a dog, I could not even know that the child has ‘mistaken’ it for a dog.”86 
Here we see, again, the “self-dividing unity” of “oneself as oneself ” and “one-
self as (playing the role of ) another.”87 While this is most manifestly seen in 
linguistic communication, the twofoldness of “someone as someone (else)” 
can be recognized generally in phenomenal consciousness. The latter some-
one, “initially a concrete individual,” tends, through human intercourse, to 
be depersonalized into “the one” (ヒト) or what Hei degger calls das Man,88 
so that the knower takes on the form of “someone as the one.” Insofar as the 
known is attributed to this someone as the one, Hiromatsu designates the 
someone as the “knowing someone” (能知的誰某), and the one as the “cog-
nizing Someone” (能識的或者), formulating the twofoldness of the knower: 
P as [P]. Just like the meaningful cognized, the cognizing Someone, if con-
sidered separately from the “real” knowing someone, exhibits a universal, 
invariable, and trans-spatial, that is, “ideal” character.89 Thus structured in 
83. hwc 1: 47. 
84. hwc 1: 38 / 973. The second page number refers to the English translation (Hiromatsu 
2011). 
85. hwc 15: 87.
86. hwc 1: 38–9 / 973–4.
87. hwc 15: 133–4.
88. hwc 15: 134, 1:44 / 977. 
89. hwc 15: 135. 
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parallel with the known, the knower “exists as the cognizing Someone who 
is more than the knowing someone.”90
It might appear to the reader that Hiromatsu is simply calling subject and 
object by other names—knower and known, respectively—and dividing 
each of them into two factors. Yet, Hiromatsu emphasizes, unlike the tradi-
tional notions of subject and object, knower and known are not “ontically 
separate,” but are just the two non-fixed aspects of a “state of union.” This 
internal link between knower and known is further specified as follows. 
First, the phenomenal given and the knowing someone are necessarily con-
nected in such a way that the former is “each time perspectivally given” to 
the latter.91 Second, and more importantly, the formation of a meaning is 
correlative with the process through which different knowers make them-
selves intersubjectively isomorphic to become a cognizing Someone. This is 
once more suitably illustrated by the cognitive structure of relativity theory: 
As we have seen earlier, the two observers posit a common meaning in corre-
lation with the process through which they transform themselves into a gen-
eral knower that corresponds to Einstein’s standpoint as a theorist. It thus 
follows, according to Hiromatsu, that “intersubjectivity” (kanshukansei 間
主観性 or kyōdōshukansei 共同主観性) serves as the essential link between 
meaning and Someone. Intersubjectivity lies in the fact that “while I and 
the other have as givens different perspectival phenomena,” we can share one 
and the same meaning.92
We can now see how the twofold structures of both knower and known 
are combined to form a fourfold structure: “a given presents itself as some-
thing to someone as Someone,” or, in fully technical terms, “a phenomenal 
given is valid as a meaningful cognized for a knowing someone as a cog-
nizing Someone” (p as [p] for P as [P]).93 For instance, something outside 
the window appears as a tree to me as a “one” (general knower); and the 
sound “ki” bears the meaning “tree” to me as a Japanese speaker. These 
four moments of the phenomenon, as Hiromatsu repeatedly stresses, are 
not self-contained elements that subsequently enter into a relation to one 
90. hwc 15: 132. 
91. hwc 15: 185. 
92. hwc 15: 189.
93. hwc 15: 198. 
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another, but themselves “can subsist only as factors of the [fourfold] func-
tional relationship.”94 Moreover, as is seen from our discussion so far, a four-
fold-structured phenomenon itself is “not closed in on itself as a four-term 
relation,” but exists only in relation to other phenomena, that is, to other 
fourfold formations.95 Insofar as the phenomenon is thus relationally struc-
tured, Hiromatsu names it the koto (事)—a Japanese term that defies simple 
translation but may roughly be rendered as “state of affairs” or Sachverhalt.96 
He counterposes this koto to the mono (物), namely, the thing (Ding, res) 
that is taken as substantial or self-contained.
It is in terms of this contrast between koto and mono that Hiromatsu 
defines the term “reification” (物象化), broadening Karl Marx’s concept of 
reification (Verdinglichung, Versachlichung)—the reification of the social 
relation between humans—into a concept that covers the whole phenome-
nal world. By reification he means mistaking a koto for a mono, that is, a mis-
conception of the fourfold structural relation such that one or more terms 
of the relation are taken as independent of the other terms or of the whole 
relationship. More strictly, in terms of the quasi-Hegelian we / it perspectival 
difference, reification is defined as the circumstance that “a koto, which is 
determined relationally from the point of view of scholarly reflection (für 
uns), appears as a mono to the immediate consciousness involved (für es).”97 
While the hypostatization of meaning constitutes the most typical mode of 
reification, Hiromatsu is, as we have seen, no less critical of the Machian or 
other modes of reification of the phenomenal given, or of the reification of 
the known or knower as a whole. A continual uncovering and overcoming 
of reification in this manner thus constitutes the leading motif of his theory 
of the fourfold structure.
Hiromatsu’s philosophical approach as outlined so far is, in his own char-
acterization, primarily a “synchronic” structural analysis of the phenomenal 
world.98 It has indeed culminated in the formulation of the synchronic four-
fold structure, in terms of which his key concept of reification, in particular, 
94. hwc 1: 45. 
95. hwc 13: 260.
96. hwc 15: 199. 
97. hwc 13: 245.
98. hwc 1: 29.
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is defined. At the same time, however, his arguments contain some lines of 
thought that cannot be confined within the synchronic framework. In fact, 
with regard to the knowing side of phenomena, we saw Hiromatsu start 
from the twofoldness of “someone as someone (else)” where, like the former 
someone, the latter is also a “concrete individual,” which has not yet been 
depersonalized into the one or cognizing Someone.99 He subsequently laid 
emphasis on the process through which the meaning and cognizing Some-
one correlatively form themselves. Thus Hiromatsu’s philosophy—and this 
is quite natural in view of his commitment to Marxian dialectics—at least 
partly opens itself to the dimension of “structural change” that is concerned 
not so much with the merely diachronic transition of already structured sys-
tems, but rather with the very process through which phenomena are struc-
tured. Nevertheless, as was the case in his analysis of Mach and relativity 
theory, he does not fully make explicit this dynamic dimension in its distinc-
tion from, and its interrelation with, the dimension of synchronic structure. 
Rather, his dynamic conceptions largely stand in latent tension with his gen-
erally synchronic framework. In the following and final section, I will focus 
on this conceptual tension and also, from that perspective, offer critical sug-
gestions on Hiromatsu’s readings of Mach’s philosophy and relativity theory. 
A critical analysis: beyond synchronic structure
Some important clues for understanding Hiromatsu’s dynamic 
conceptions may be found in some minute details of his texts rather than 
in the major lines of argument. Let us recall his phrase “in itself ” (an sich) 
as in the statement, cited earlier, that a phenomenon appears in itself as 
something more than a mere sensuous given. By this qualification “in itself,” 
Hiromatsu means that the knower is not always actually—but in many cases 
99. It is not essential here, however, to take the individual as the starting point. For, according 
to Hiromatsu, the personal individual is not a primary being any more than the one, but derives 
from the division of pre-personal phenomena into self and other (hwc 15: 112). What is impor-
tant, rather, may best be suggested by Hiromatsu’s remarks that the twofoldness of the knower 
holds “except for the latent ‘knowing subject’ in the genetically initial phase,” and that some 
kinds of mental illness may be characterized as a “disintegration” of the cognizing Someone 
(hwc 15: 148, 2: 453). These remarks imply his acknowledgement that there are phases or cases 
in which the cognizing Someone is either not yet established or has already collapsed.
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only potentially—conscious of the twofoldness of phenomena. According 
to Hiromatsu, “in the immediate consciousness of the subject involved,” the 
phenomenon is commonly a full unity of given and meaning. “In reflective 
consciousness,” however, it is readily “bifurcated” into the two moments.100 
This indicates the essential relevance of reflection on phenomena to the 
twofold character (of the known side) of phenomena themselves.
Furthermore, Hiromatsu continues, as soon as one is conscious of the 
phenomenal given in distinction to the meaning, this given is no longer a 
given as such, but is itself dualized into a given and a meaning. 
For instance, when one is aware of a “comma” [in a written text] and then 
tries to make explicit “the given” of which one has just been aware as a 
comma, one is now aware of that moment as, say, a black spot. That is, one is 
aware of the given anew in a twofold structure, as a cognized “black spot,” 
which is different from the initially cognized “comma.”101 
This argument, seen earlier in outline, is meant to prove the non-presence of 
the phenomenal given “purified” of meaning. In my view, however, what is 
more important here lies in the course of the argument itself. That is to say, 
reflective consciousness not only makes explicit the twofoldness of the phe-
nomenon (p as [p]), but at the same time produces a new twofold formation 
(pʹ as [pʹ]). Reflection on a phenomenon, itself involved in the phenomenal 
world, cannot simply be to see the phenomenon just as it is, but necessarily 
redetermines it in meaning. In other words, a phenomenon, as soon as it is 
reflected upon, undergoes a change or displacement in meaning.
Hiromatsu’s other passages further suggest that displacing movements 
occur not only with reflection on a phenomenon, but are already contained 
in a “single” phenomenon. To see this point, we must pay attention to a 
subtle difference between the following two ways in which he formulates 
the duality of given and meaning. On the one hand, Hiromatsu states that 
a phenomenon appears as something “more than a mere ‘sensible’ given,” or 
something other than a phenomenal given. This type of formulation readily 
leads to the synchronic frame in which the phenomenon consists of the two 
factors of given and meaning. On the other hand, Hiromatsu also maintains 
100. hwc 1: 348. 
101. hwc 1: 348.
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that the phenomenon is such that, “in showing itself…, it always already 
shows something else.” This mode of expression implies that the phenome-
non contains in itself a movement of becoming other than itself or a displace-
ment of itself. It is without doubt this latter formulation that is relevant to 
the dynamic dimension, which is rendered invisible in the first formulation.
These considerations of the processes through which phenomena are 
structured, however, appear to stand in a rather ambivalent relation to Hiro-
matsu’s primarily synchronic or static framework. On the one hand, they 
serve as “an auxiliary means for the theory of the structure of being,”102 as is 
illustrated by the previous argument for the non-presence of the pure given. 
Yet, on the other hand, those dynamic considerations could undermine the 
synchronic framework by questioning the general validity of the formula-
tion of the fourfold structure. If there are phases or cases in which the two-
foldness of the known as well as the knower is not yet established, and if 
any such twofold formation, even once established, is subject to incessant 
displacement, then the twofold—and hence the fourfold—structure may be 
reconceived as a static projection of the de- and restructuring of phenomena.
I have elsewhere thematized this issue, through following Hiromatsu’s 
dynamic conceptions further than he himself does, eventually to suggest the 
possibility that his synchronic formulation of the fourfold structure may 
itself be viewed as reifying.103 Here, however, instead of directly pursuing 
this issue, let us take a kind of detour: Returning to the questions concern-
ing Mach’s philosophy and Einstein’s relativity theory, I wish to sketch out 
my own reading thereof—with attention to some comparable tensions in 
their thought—so as to shed critical sidelights on Hiromatsu’s philosophy 
and his interpretive approaches to the physicists’ thought. As we saw in the 
first two sections, Hiromatsu’s readings of Mach’s philosophy and relativ-
ity theory do not entirely limit themselves to the dimension of synchronic 
structure, but contain some references to the dynamic dimension in which 
phenomena are structured. With regard to Mach, Hiromatsu critically 
argues that his philosophy neglects the process through which phenomena 
are endowed with ideal and intersubjective meanings; his analysis of relativ-
ity theory is also concerned with the process through which different phe-
102. hwc 15: 36.
103. Katsumori 1993 and Chapter 1 of Katsumori 2009.
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nomena are grasped in a single meaning. Nevertheless, in these analyses (no 
less than in his general theory of the fourfold structure), Hiromatsu leaves 
the two dimensions—synchronic structure and structuring movement—
largely in latent tension without elaborating on how they are related to each 
other. In what follows, focusing precisely on this relation between the two 
dimensions, I will briefly present an alternative reading of Mach’s philoso-
phy, and then of relativity theory.
In Mach’s philosophy, just as in Hiromatsu’s, there seem to be two differ-
ent lines of thinking that are hardly in accord with each other. On the one 
hand, Mach’s critique of “metaphysical” notions, including the hypostati-
zation of mind and body, rests on the contrast between direct experience 
and “thought symbols” or “things of thought.” Specifically, in his critique 
of Newtonian physics, Mach rejects absolute space and absolute motion 
as “mere things of thought (Gedankendinge) that cannot be shown in 
experience.”104 To be sure, some things of thought—“certain mathematical 
functions,” for example—may or even need to be used as “auxiliary represen-
tations” or “provisional aids” for economical descriptions of phenomena.105 
Yet—and this is crucial to Mach—they have nothing to do with the phe-
nomena themselves. We must “distinguish sharply between concept and law 
on one side and fact on the other.”106 Physics, in particular, should restrict 
itself to “the expression of the factual, without constructing hypotheses 
behind it” and “without imagining… anything other than physical charac-
teristics… directly or indirectly given by observation.”107 
This line of argument in Mach’s work adopts a series of binary oppo-
sitions such as experience / thought, fact / concept, and phenomenon / 
representation, which, though not strictly equivalent, are closely associated 
with one another.108 While what he calls metaphysics has generally privi-
104. Mach 1883, 222–3 / 280. Mach remarks similarly on “spaces of more than three dimen-
sions” as well as “atoms” (Mach 1883, 466–7 / 588–9).
105. Mach 1883, 466–7 / 589. 
106. Mach 1905, 456 / 356. 
107. Mach 1883, 473 / 597.
108. Elsewhere in his work, we can locate further parallel pairs of terms: sensation / under-
standing (Verstand), sensuous / intellectual, real / ideal, natural / artificial, and so forth (see 
Mach 1886, 19, 87; 1896, 600). To which one of the opposing sides Mach classifies non-con-
ceptual representation (Vorstellung) is not unambiguous, but seems to depend on the context.
katsumori: hiromatsu on mach and relativity Theory | 179
leged and hypostatized the second term of each opposition, Mach seeks to 
overturn this hierarchy, giving priority to the first term, namely, fact, experi-
ence, or the sensuous phenomenon. That is to say, he still remains within 
the binary framework, while simply reversing the order of value. He upholds 
the opposition between empirical fact, which is originally present, and 
conceptual thought, which secondarily represents it—or, in other words, 
between supposedly self-sufficient experience and its mere “supplementa-
tion” in thought. This being the case, Mach’s philosophy does have a dual-
istic aspect, contrary to Hiromatsu’s assessment that it only “superficially” 
seems so. While rejecting mind-matter dualism and the separation of sub-
ject and object, Mach maintains the hierarchical binary of experience and 
its conceptual representation, and to this extent his philosophy remains an 
inverted system of metaphysics.109 
On the other hand, Mach does not restrict himself to such a simple 
inversion of metaphysics. In another important aspect, his philosophy 
denies—rather than devalues—anything in the world that is not sensuous 
or phenomenal. He maintains, as we have seen earlier, that, in cognition, 
the connection of sensuous elements is represented by other sensuous ele-
ments (αβγ…). That is to say, just as fact consists of sensuous elements, so 
also does what represents fact. Moreover, since all elements are homog-
enous and of equal value, empirical facts and its conceptual representations 
are of the same kind and the same rank as to their components. This being 
the case, there can be no fundamental opposition between experience and 
thought, and no primacy of the one over the other. It is in this sense that, as 
Mach repeatedly stresses, “we ourselves, with our thoughts, are just a part of 
nature.”110 To be sure, the homogeneity of all elements as such does not nec-
essarily prevent their complexes from being classified into immediate givens 
and their representations. Such a distinction, however, cannot be concerned 
with the ontic status of the complexes of elements. Mach’s remark, for exam-
ple, that “even the wildest dream is a fact as much as any other” implies that 
109. Einstein seems to have interpreted Mach along this line. In 1922, he notes that “for 
Mach, there are two points to distinguish: On the one hand, there are the immediate data of ex-
perience, things we cannot change; on the other hand, there are concepts which we can modify” 
(cpw 13: 248).
110. Mach 1883, 217 / 273.
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no complexes whatever have priority over the others.111 We can thus see that 
the binary system of metaphysics is not inverted, but dissolved.
In this context, Mach’s concept of “supplementation” takes on a differ-
ent connotation. Contrary to privileging empirical facts, he now holds that 
the given facts by themselves may be “incomplete,” and that incomplete 
facts are rendered complete by being supplemented with representations or 
thoughts. Put succinctly, by virtue of supplementation, facts become “more 
to us” than what they are as such.112 We can see that supplementation here 
no longer means simple addition to self-sufficient facts, but is reconceived 
as an integral moment of the phenomena as they cognitively appear to us. 
Further, according to Mach, there are cases in which our thoughts or rep-
resentations not so much complete the facts, but rather “replace” (ersetzen) 
them.113 In other words, the dynamics of supplementation may take the 
form of a substitution of thought or intellect for experience. Since thoughts 
themselves also consist of elements, it follows that supplementation or sub-
stitution brings about “new sensuous elements,” which then become part 
of the phenomenal world. Being as it is a representation of facts, cognition 
thus alters and displaces what is represented. That is, cognition is not merely 
a “transformation of thought,” but also a transformation and restructuring 
of the phenomenal world itself.114
We have differentiated between two aspects of Mach’s thought, which are 
intermingled in his texts and yet seem to be in disparity with each other. 
The first aspect, characterized as an inverted metaphysics, rests on the static 
opposition of experience /  thought, while the second is oriented to the 
dynamic process of supplementation which tends to dissolve that opposi-
tion.115 In other words, along the first line of thought, one describes nature as 
111. Mach 1886, 9 / 11.
112. Mach 1886, 163 / 198, 273 / 334.
113. Mach 1883, 457 / 577.
114. Mach 1896, 255.
115. These two conflicting aspects of Mach’s thought may be reminiscent of Jacque Derrida’s 
account of the “double gesture” of deconstruction: an “overturning” and a “general displace-
ment” of the system of hierarchical binary oppositions (Derrida 1972, 392 / 329). In this con-
nection, what I have suggested as the double meaning of Mach’s concept of supplementation 
could also be compared with Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of the notion of the “supple-
ment” (see Derrida 1967, 203ff. / 141ff.).
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“it is only once there,”116 while the second suggests that cognition each time 
alters the phenomenal world. We could say that the former mode of thought 
constitutes Mach’s positivist and scientistic aspect, which would find enthu-
siastic followers not least in the group known as the Vienna Circle, whereas 
the latter comes close to Mach’s contemporary Friedrich Nietzsche’s more 
radical critique of knowledge.117
It now appears that this conflict in Mach’s philosophy is not only left 
untouched by Hiromatsu, but also is highly parallel to what we have seen 
as a tension within Hiromatsu’s philosophy itself, the tension between 
synchronic structure and structuring movement. Admittedly, from the 
Hiromatsuan point of view, the above conflict in Mach’s thought could 
as such be resolved by the twofoldness of given and meaning. That is, the 
distinction between sensuous and non-sensuous (or real and ideal) would 
not be abandoned, but reformulated as two inseparable moments of phe-
nomena. Mach’s criticism of metaphysics would then be remodeled into 
a critique of the reification of meaning, and his ideas of supplementation 
and substitution could be viewed as modes of the as-connection—say, cor-
responding to “something more” and “something else,” respectively. Such a 
critical appropriation of Mach’s ideas into Hiromatsu’s philosophy, however, 
will not leave intact the latter’s synchronic setting. Rather, it may lead to an 
explicitly dynamic reformulation of the as-connection and thus to a critical 
reexamination of Hiromatsu’s general theoretical framework.
Let us now proceed to Einstein’s relativity theory and accordingly 
extend our scope of analysis to include explicitly what Hiromatsu calls 
the knowing side of phenomena. Most relevant to our issue here seem to 
be the differences between the special and the general theories of relativ-
ity. As mentioned in the second section, Hiromatsu does not essentially dis-
tinguish between the two theories in their philosophical dimension, even 
as he points to a difference in the extent to which substantial notions are 
replaced by relational ones. It seems to me, however, that, between the two 
116. Mach 1883, 459 / 580.
117. A radicalization of Mach’s ideas of supplementation and substitution may lead to the 
Nietzschean view that all facts are perspectival interpretations. Common features to be found 
between Mach’s and Nietzsche’s thought are addressed, for example, by Heller 1964, 69–71, 
and Blackmore 1972, 123.
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theories, there is a qualitative difference in the philosophical orientation—a 
difference that revolves around the distinction between the movement of 
intersubjective structuring and the synchronic structure of intersubjectivity. 
Since I have elsewhere analyzed this issue,118 it will suffice here to reproduce 
the main points.
Einstein’s special relativity, in its pre-Minkowskian form and notably in 
the form presented in his first relativity paper of 1905, “On the Electrody-
namics of Moving Bodies,” is marked by its methodology consistently rest-
ing on the situation in which observation and measurement are carried out. 
In it, Einstein develops a series of thought experiments, where the procedure 
of measurement by means of rigid rods and / or clocks as well as the stand-
point from which (von … aus) the phenomena are observed is each time 
specified.119 Starting from the individual results of measurement, which are 
relative to the observational standpoints, Einstein seeks to combine them 
into a set of functional relations. He advances this process by alternately 
assuming in thought two observational standpoints belonging to different 
inertial systems in such a way that both standpoints, and potentially the 
standpoints of all inertial systems, are on an equal footing de jure. This is 
the procedure by which communication between observers is imaginatively 
carried out as a series of substitutions of their standpoints for each other. 
The principle of relativity, applied in this process, is not simply treated as 
a mathematical requirement of covariance, but is conceived primarily as a 
requirement for the equal legitimacy of all observational standpoints, which 
is meaningful and applicable only within the context of observation and 
measurement. It is thus crucial to special relativity that its conceptual sys-
tem is intersubjectified within the observational context and in accordance 
with the demand for the equal legitimacy of observational standpoints. As 
we have seen earlier, the relevance of this process of intersubjectification was 
discussed explicitly by Einstein himself in the 1921 Princeton lectures, in an 
extended context of scientific cognition in general.
Einstein’s methodological orientation, however, underwent a consider-
able change with the development of general relativity. In his 1916 paper, 
“The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity,” Einstein initially 
118. See Katsumori 1992, esp. 564–7, 577–8, 585ff.
119. See cpe 2: 297ff ./ 142ff.
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seems to follow his 1905 approach resting on observational situations, 
when he devises several thought experiments involving mutually acceler-
ated systems. In parallel with the counterpart in special relativity, the gen-
eral principle of relativity here serves as a demand for the equal legitimacy 
of all possible observational standpoints. However, this methodology then 
quickly encounters a serious difficulty: Since the scales for space-time mea-
surement, namely, rigid rods and clocks, prove to be dependent on the 
gravitational field or, equivalently, on the metrical property of space-time, 
Euclidean geometry is no longer valid and thus the coordinates of space and 
time cannot retain their “direct physical meaning.”120 From this breakdown 
of the immediate correspondence between the results of measurement and 
the space-time coordinates, it follows that one can no longer start directly 
from individual measuring acts, and thus no longer directly apply the 
basic principles in the observational context. Accordingly, Einstein “trans-
lates” the general principle of relativity mathematically into the principle 
of general covariance. The latter principle is formulated without reference 
to observational situations and, as he puts it, “takes away from space and 
time the last remnant of physical objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit).”121 At this 
juncture, there occurs a crucial conceptual shift from the equal legitimacy 
of the observational standpoints to the isomorphism of the formulations of 
physical laws with respect to these standpoints.
Thus detaching himself from the observational context (except for the 
reference to local Lorentz systems), Einstein goes over to a deductive con-
struction of the theory with the aid of tensor calculus. The importance of 
tensors lies in the fact that once a tensor equation holds in one system, an 
equation of the same form holds in any other system whatsoever. That is, if 
a physical law is expressed in tensor form, this form itself ensures the gen-
eral covariance of the law.122 The tensor formulation already incorporates 
in itself the demand for the equal legitimacy of all possible observational 
standpoints, and thereby guarantees in advance the intersubjective validity 
of the law to these standpoints. This allows Einstein to replace his earlier 
procedure of intersubjectifying physical concepts, carried out by alternately 
120. cpe 6: 288 / 151.
121. cpe 6: 291 / 153.
122. cpe 6: 780 / 121. 
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assuming different observational standpoints, with a purely mathematical 
procedure of forming tensor equations. 
We can now see that Einstein’s general relativity is not simply a consis-
tent extension of special relativity, but that it contains philosophically dif-
ferent conceptions from the latter. While it is crucial to the special theory 
to develop a conceptual system through intersubjective structuring of phe-
nomena, the general theory relieves itself of this task by virtue of a math-
ematical guarantee of the structure of intersubjectivity. This conceptual 
orientation of general relativity tends toward the notion that the intersub-
jective agreement of the observers holds well prior to any act of observa-
tion and measurement, and further that the concept formation is carried 
out, as it were, by a higher-level knower—equivalent to a theorizing sub-
ject—transcending the individual observational standpoints. Admittedly, 
the methodological features of general relativity cannot automatically be 
carried over into the epistemological or ontological level. Yet a close inspec-
tion of Einstein’s later philosophical texts will suggest a crucial link that 
connects the above mode of thought of general relativity with Einstein’s 
general philosophical ideas.
In a 1936 essay entitled “Physics and Reality,” Einstein offers a general 
account of our cognition, starting with the way in which the concept of 
the body is formed. Out of the multitude of experiences, he maintains, one 
takes certain repeated sense complexes “partly together with sense impres-
sions interpreted as signs for sense experiences of neighbors (Mitmen-
schen),” and attributes to them the concept of the bodily object.123 This, in 
an important respect, makes a sharp contrast with the account presented 
earlier in the Princeton lectures. That is, experiences of different individu-
als are here not to be coordinated through their linguistic communication, 
but already given as part of my experiences. Instead of focusing on the pro-
cess of intersubjectification of experiences, Einstein adopts the framework 
in which intersubjectivity is in advance tacitly embedded and the concept 
formation is carried out by a single knowing subject. This framework, we 
can now see, precisely accords with the above conceptual setting of general 
relativity. Einstein’s philosophical turn, characterized by himself as one from 
123. Einstein 1979, 64 / 60.
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a pro-Machian empiricism to a kind of rationalism,124 proves to be a process 
through which the dimension of intersubjectification is concealed—a pro-
cess that seems to have its source in the formulation of general relativity.125
This implies that the relation between relativity theory and Einstein’s 
philosophical ideas poses more complex issues than Hiromatsu supposed. 
We cannot simply contrast the “revolutionary” philosophical implica-
tions of the theory itself and the “conservatism” of Einstein’s philosophical 
position. Up until the early 1920’s, Einstein was well aware of the dimen-
sion of intersubjectification as it was consistently at work in special relativ-
ity. General relativity, however, set up a conceptual scheme that made the 
intersubjective structure seem to be pre-established, which led to an unwit-
ting concealment of the process of intersubjectification, and eventually to a 
reinstatement of the traditional subject / object schema. Thus, what appears 
as Einstein’s return to the philosophical tradition occurred not so much 
despite, but rather because of—and in structural accordance with—the 
development of relativity theory. If his later philosophical thought is subject 
to a critique of reification, then this critique must trace back to philosophi-
cal conceptions internal to relativity theory.
Our consideration so far in this final section enables us to see that the 
conflictual relation between synchronic structure and structuring move-
ment in Mach’s philosophy as well as relativity theory is not only largely 
overlooked by Hiromatsu, but also is essentially parallel with a problematic 
confronting Hiromatsu’s philosophy itself. This makes it all the more neces-
sary to review critically his interpretations of Mach’s thought and relativity 
theory as bound up with his general theory of the fourfold structure. Our 
study offers further critical suggestions on Hiromatsu’s general attitude 
toward modern physical science. As we have seen, he highly evaluates the 
novel philosophical orientation of twentieth-century physics, which, he 
holds, potentially goes beyond the modern worldview. Notwithstanding his 
break with orthodox Marxism, which he labels as objectivist and “scientis-
tic,” and although his philosophical work was developed within a cultural 
milieu that was highly critical of contemporary science and technology,126 
124. See a letter from Einstein to C. Lanczos (January 24, 1938), cited in Holton 1973, 241.
125. See Katsumori 1992, 590.
126. See, for example, Noé 1982, 198–203.
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Hiromatsu largely restricts the targets of his criticism to classical modern sci-
ence and—as far as non-classical science is concerned—to the insufficient 
philosophical self-understanding of working scientists. If, however, non-clas-
sical physics is philosophically more complex and raises such issues as those 
addressed above, his positive appraisal of it may be subject to critical review. 
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